Abstract. We prove a general form of bit flip formula for the quantum Fourier transform on finite abelian groups and use it to encode some general CSS codes on these groups.
Introduction
In classical public key cryptography the security of the cryptosystems are based on the difficulty of calculating certain functions. A famous example is the ASP cryptosystem which was based on the assumption that factoring large integers could not be done in polynomial time (on classical computers). The typical situation in these systems is that two parties (Bob and Alice) whish to communicate in secret. Instead of sharing a secrete key in advance (which confront us with the relatively difficult issue of secret key distribution), Bob announces a public key which is used by Alice to encrypt a message, sent to Bob. The encryption is done in a clever way so that if a third party (Eve) wants to decrypt it a non feasible amount of calculation is needed. Bob, however, has a secret key of his own which enables him to do the encryption in real time.
Quantum cryptography has a different way of keeping things secret. The difficulty of some calculations is replaced by the impossibility of some calculations according to the laws of quantum mechanics. The first example of the quantum key distribution protocol was published in 1984 by Bennett and Brassard [BB] which is now called BB84 code. The security of this protocol is gauranteed by the impossibility of measuring the state of a quantum system in two conjugate bases simultaneously. A complete proof of security against any possible attack (i.e. any combination of physical operations permitted by the laws of quantum mechanics) was given later [LC] , [M] , [BBMR] . A simple proof of this fact is proposed by Shor and Preskill in [SP] . They first showed the security of a modified Lo-Chau code which is a entanglement purification protocol and uses EPR pairs. Then they showed that it is equivalent to a quantum error correcting code, namely the CSS code introduced independently in [CS] and [S] . This later code was constructed on the vector space {0, 1} n after the classical binary codes. Finally they reduced the CSS code to BB84. The basic idea of this final step was to avoid the quantum memory and reduce the encoding and decoding to classical computations.
The encoding part in the CSS protocol in [SP] was based on the following property of linear codes: If C is a linear code then the value of 1 |C| y∈C (−1)
x.y is 1 or 0 when x ∈ C ⊥ or x / ∈ C ⊥ , respectively. This is used to show that the Hadamard gate transforms the state 1
In this paper we generalize this observation to the setting of arbitrary finite abelian groups (note that in linear coding theory {0, 1} n is treated as a vector space, but it is also an abelian group). We show that for a finite abelian group G, a subgroup H, and elements a, b ∈ G, the quantum Fourier transform sends the state 1
where {χ x : x ∈ G} is a Fourier basis for G and H ⊥ = {x ∈ G : χ x (y) = 1 (y ∈ H)}. We use this to build a version of CSS code adapted to the group case. We show that the calculations of [SP] carries over and we can reduce this code to a generalized version of BB84 built on group G. The paper continues as follows. In section 2 we introduce the quantum Fourier transform on a finite abelian group G and prove the above statement. In section 3 we discuss quantum error correction codes and introduce the CSS code on G. In the last section we above mentioned two protocols and show their equivalence.
quantum Fourier transform
Let G be a finite abelian (additive) group. Let H = CG be a Hilbert space with the orthonormal basis {|x : x ∈ G}, called the standard basis of H. There is a natural action of G on H by translation
Note that CG is also an algebra under the convolution product
A character on G is a nonzero group homomorphism χ : G → T, where T is the multiplicative group of the complex numbers of modulus 1. The values χ(x) are |G|-th roots of unity. The setĜ of all characters on G is an abelian group with respect to the pointwise multiplication and is called the dual group of G. It is well known that |Ĝ| = |G| and so we may index the elements ofĜ by elements of G, and writê G = {χ x : x ∈ G}. Indeed in the finite group case we have,Ĝ ≃ G, so we may assume that χ x χ y = χ x+y and χ x (y) = χ y (x), for each x, y ∈ G, and χ 0 ∼ = 1. Also we have the Schur's orthogonality relations
For each x ∈ G cosider the state
then the above orthogonality relations imply that {|χ x : x ∈ G} forms a orthonormal basis for H, called the Fourier basis of H. This basis is translation invariant in the sense that
The quantum Fourier transform on G is the unitary operator F G :
Note that one can extend this map by linearity on H (see [J] ). Two classical examples are G = Z m where
and G = {0, 1} n where
in which F G is the usual discrete Fourier transform DF T m on Z m and the Hadamard transform H n , respectively. Each element ofĜ could be extended by linearity to a linear functional on CG. This is indeed a multiplicative functional with respect to the convolution product andĜ exhusts the set of all multiplicative linear functionals [R] . The well known Peter-Weil theorem applied to the finite group G, tells us thatĜ is an orthonormal basis for the linear dual space (CG) * . In particular (CG) * ≃ CĜ. For each subset H ⊆ G, CH is a subspace of CG, generated by {|x : x ∈ H}. We put
. This notion goes in parallel with the notion of the orthogonal complement L ⊥ for a subspace L ≤ CG. Of course (CH) ⊥ and CH ⊥ are not the same (even the dimensions don't match).
Now K has exactly two cosets in H, so [H : K] = 2 and the group generated by x 0 is isomorphic to the quotient group H/K of order 2, so x 0 has order 2. In particular
, and so χ x (x 0 ) = −1.QED Lemma 2.2. For each x ∈ G and H ≤ G we have
then with the notation of the above lemma
For each x, y ∈ G let |x y| be the rank one operator on H = CG defined by (|x y|)|z = y|z |x (z ∈ G) then one can decompose the quantum Fourier transform as a combination of rank one operators.
Lemma 2.3.
Proof If F G is defined by above formula, then for each z ∈ G
Now we are ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 2.1. Let a, b ∈ G and H ≤ G and consider the state
Proof If we use the above lemma and the fact that
we have
quantum error correcting codes
A quantum channel Q is a trace preserving completely positive linear map
where A i 's are error operators with i∈I A † i A i equal to the identity operator. In general Q is not invertible, unless restricted to a subspace. A subspace C ≤ H in is called a quantum error correcting code(QECC) for Q if there is a decoding operator D such that
, for some constants α kℓ , where P C is the projection operator onto C [K] . Now let G be a finite abelian group and
Elements of G n are words x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and the words in C are called codewords. For x, y ∈ G n , the distance d(x, y) is the number of coordinates in which x and y differ. The weight of a word x is the number wt(x) of its nonzero coordinates, where zero is the identity of G.
Suppose C 1 and C 2 are [n, k 1 ] G and [n, k 2 ] G codes with C 2 ≤ C 1 and C 1 and C ⊥ 2 both correct t errors. We define a quantum code CSS G (C 1 , C 2 ) capable of correcting errors on t qubits. For a codeword x ∈ C 1 put
Note that |x + C 2 only depends on the coset of C 1 /C 2 to which x + C 2 belongs. Also |x + C 2 is orthogonal to |y + C 2 , if x and y are representatives of different cosets of C 2 . The quantum code CSS G (C 1 , C 2 ) is defined on the vector space spanned by the states |x + C 2 , where x ranges in C 1 . In particular the dimension of
Suppose that a bit flip and a phase flip errors have occured. These are described by two "n bit" vectors e 1 , e 2 ∈ G n . If |ψ = |x + C 2 is the original state, then the corrupted state would be
as in the binary case, the encoding process starts with introducing a ancilla (of sufficient length) initially in the all zero state |0 . We apply the parity matrix H 1 for the code C 1 taking |x + y + e 1 |0 to |x + y + e 1 |H 1 (x + y + e 1 = |x + y + e 1 |H 1 e 1 where the above equality follows from the fact that x + y ∈ C 1 , and so H 1 (x + y) = 0. The effect of this operation on |ψ 1 |0 is 1 |C 2 | y∈C 2 χ e 2 (x + y)|x + y + e 1 |H 1 e 1 Now error detection for the bit flip error is simply done by measuring the ancilla. This gives us H 1 e 1 , from which we can infer e 1 , since C 1 can correct up to t errors. The result of discarding the ancilla is the state |ψ 2 = 1 |C 2 | y∈C 2 χ e 2 (x + y)|x + y + e 1
Next applying the U † e 1 : |z → |z − e 1 unitary gate to this state, we obtain |ψ 3 = 1 |C 2 | y∈C 2 χ e 2 (x + y)|x + y The next step is applying the quantum Fourier transform F G n = F G ⊗ · · · ⊗ F G (n times) to |ψ 3 . Using Theorem 2.1 (applied to G n with H = C 2 , a = −e 2 , and b = x) we get
As for the error detection for the bit flip, we introduce an ancilla and apply the parity matrix H 2 for C ⊥ 2 to obtain H 2 (−e 2 ), and correct the phase flip error (now showing up as a bit flip error), obtaining the state
Again applying F G n and using Theorem 2.1 (with H = C ⊥ 2 , a = −x, and b = 0) we get
Finally, applying the U 2 x : |z → |z + x + x unitary gate to this state, we get back our original state
with a slight modification of the above proof, we have
. . , v k } be the set of representatives of the quotient group C 1 /C 2 , then the k = k 1 k 2 mutually orthogonal states
are a basis for a quantum error correction code C ≤ H ⊗ n , where H = CG is the group algebra of G. The code can simultaneously correct at least ⌊ 
a quantum error correction protocol
In this section we use a version of the quantum error correction code CSS G (C 1 , C 2 ) to write a quantum error correction protocol similar to the protocol introduced in [CS] (for the case G = F 2 ). Let C 1 and C 2 be as in the Theorem 3.1, for each x ∈ C ⊥ 1 and z ∈ C 2 consider the quantum error correction code CSS z,x G (C 1 , C 2 ) with codeword states
where v ranges over the representatives of the |C 1 |/|C 2 | cosets of C 2 in C 1 (we use the notation [v] as an abbriviation for the coset v +C 2 . Note that the number of these states is
We show that these states are mutually orthogonal, and therefore form a basis for an |G| n -dimensional vector space.
Proof Using Lemma 2.2 applied to G n (with H = C 2 and x = w 1 − w 2 ) we have
Let us use the abbreviation v,z,x to denote the summation over all [v] ∈ C 1 /C 2 , z ∈ C 2 , and x ∈ C ⊥ 1 . Lemma 4.2. v,z,x |ψ v,z,x ψ v,z,x | = I, the identity operator on CG n .
By above lemma
|v + w + x v + w + x| but each y ∈ G n has a unique decomposition y = v + w + x, for some [v] ∈ C 1 /C 2 , w ∈ C 2 , and x ∈ C ⊥ 1 . Therefore the last sum is the same as y∈G n |y y| = I.QED A similar argument proves Lemma 4.3. v,z,x |ψ v,z,x |ψ v,z,x = y∈G n |y |y . Now we are ready to present our quantum error correction protocol. It is based on the modified Lo-Chau protocol [LC] and follows the presentation of a similar construction as reported in [NC] . It uses our quantum error correction code to perform entanglement distillation. The basic difference here is the meaning of a "qubit". For us a qubit is a basis element of H = CG, namely a state of the form |t , where t ∈ G (bit has a similar meaning). Also let us remind that the standard basis of H is {|t : t ∈ G}. So for the given finite abelian group G, we have the following protocol.
QKD protocol: CSS G codes 1: Alice creates n random check bits, a random m bit key k, and two random n bit strings x and z. She encodes |k in the code CSS z,x G (C 1 , C 2 ). She also encodes n qubits according to the check bits.
2: Alice randomely chooses n positions (out of 2n) and puts the check qubits in these positions and the encoded qubits in the remaining positions.
3: Alice selects a random 2n bit string b and performs a Fourier transform F G on each qubit for which b is not 0 (0 is the identity of G).
4:
Alice sends the resulting qubits to Bob.
5:
Bob receives the qubits and publicly announces this fact.
6: Alice announces b, z, x, and which n qubits are to provide check bits.
7:
Bob performs the Fourier transform on the qubits where b is not 0.
8: Bob measures the n check qubits in the standard basis, and publicly shares the results with Alice. If more than t of these disagree, they abort the protocol.
9: Bob decodes the remaining n qubits from CSS z,x G (C 1 , C 2 ). 10: Bob measures his qubits to obtain the shared secret key k.
A series of remarks are in order. We have emplyed CSS G (C 1 , C 2 ) code, which we assumed to encode m qubits in n qubits and correct up to t errors. The Alice's n EPR pair state may be written as the equal states given in Lemma 4.3. Note the lables are separated to indicate the qubits Alice keeps, and the ones she sends to Bob. If Alice wants to measure her remaining qubits according to the check matrix for CSS G (C 1 , C 2 ), she obtains random values for x and z, and if she wants to measure the m EPR pair in the standard basis, she obtains a random choice of v. Then the remaining n qubits are left in the state |ψ v,z,x , which is the codeword for v in CSS z,x G (C 1 , C 2 ) and is the encoded version of the state k .
Following [SP] , one may do the following modifications in the protocol. Bob measures his qubits in the standard basis (which is e version of the Z basis in the binary case) after decoding so the phase correction sent as z by Alice is irrelevant. Therefore, instead of decoding and then measuring, Bob can immidiately measure to obtain v + w + x (up to some error), then decode (classically ) as follows. He can subtract the annonced value of x and coorect the result to a codeword in C 1 , which would be v + w if the distance of the code is not exceeded. Then the key k is the coset v + w + C 2 in C 1 . Now as Alice need not reveal z, she is effectively sending a mixed state averaged over random values of z, which by Lemma 4.1 is 1 |G| n w∈C 2 |v + w + x v + w + x| To create this state, Alice only needs to choose w ∈ C 2 randomely and construct |v + w + x with her random values of x and k. Also if Alice happens to choose v ∈ C 1 (rather than [v] ∈ C 1 /C 2 ), then w is unnecessary. In this case, Alice may choose x at random, send |x so that Bob receives and measures x (with some error), then Alice sends x − v, which is subtracted by Bob to obtain v (with some error). This leaves no difference between the random check bits and the code bits. Finally to avoid the performance of the Fourier transform by Alice, she can encode her qubits in the standard basis {|t : t ∈ G} or the Fourier basis {|χ t : t ∈ G}, according to the bits of b, where
Then Bob could measure the received qubits randomely in the standard or Fourier bases. When Alice subsequently annonces b, they can keep only those bits for which their bases were the same. As they are most likely to discard half of their bits, they should start with a little more than twice the number of original random bits. This way Alice can delay her choice of check bits until after discarding. This allows us to avoid the use of quantum memory and perform the encoding and decoding classically. Summing up we have the following version of BB84, adapted to the group G.
QKD protocol: BB84 G codes 1: Alice creates (4 + δ)n random bits.
2:
Alice creates for each bit a qubit in the standard or Fourier basis, according to a random bit string b (uses standard basis if at bits for which b is 0, and the Fourier basis otherwise).
3: Alice sends the resulting qubits to Bob.
4:
Alice chooses a random v ∈ C 1 . 5: Bob receives the qubits, publicly announces this fact, and measures each in the standard or Fourier basis at random.
6: Alice announces b.
7: Alice and Bob discard those bits Bob measured in a basis other than the one instructed by b. With high probability, there are at least 2n bits left (if not abort the protocol). Alice decides randomely on a set of 2n bits to continue to use, randomely selects n of these to be check bits, and announces the selecrtion.
8:
Alice and Bob publicly compare their check bits. If more than t of these disagree, they abort the protocol. Alice is left with the n bit string x, and Bob with x + ε.
9:
Alice annonces x−v. Bob subtracts this from his result, correcting it with code C 1 to obtain v.
10: Alice and Bob compute the coset v + C 2 in C 1 /C 2 to obtain the key k.
